Encender la reciprocidad indirecta en un experimento de campo a gran escala (Record no. 174965)

MARC details
000 -CABECERA
campo de control de longitud fija 02401nab a2200289 a 4500
005 - FECHA Y HORA DE LA ÚLTIMA TRANSACCIÓN
campo de control 20210219162354.0
008 - ELEMENTOS DE LONGITUD FIJA--INFORMACIÓN GENERAL
campo de control de longitud fija 991125s1985 mx 000 0 spa u
035 ## - NÚMERO DE CONTROL DEL SISTEMA
Número de control de sistema UPN01000202864
049 ## - COLECCIÓN
Colección ART
100 1# - ASIENTO PRINCIPAL--NOMBRE PERSONAL
Nombre de persona Yoeli, Erez
100 1# - ASIENTO PRINCIPAL--NOMBRE PERSONAL
Nombre de persona Hoffman, Moshe
100 1# - ASIENTO PRINCIPAL--NOMBRE PERSONAL
Nombre de persona Rand, David G
100 1# - ASIENTO PRINCIPAL--NOMBRE PERSONAL
Nombre de persona Nowak, Martin A
100 1# - ASIENTO PRINCIPAL--NOMBRE PERSONAL
Filiación martin_nowak@harvard.edu
222 #0 - TÍTULO CLAVE
Título clave LUDUS VITALIS : REVISTA DE FILOSOFIA DE LAS CIENCIAS DE LA VIDA
245 00 - MENCIÓN DE TÍTULO
Título Encender la reciprocidad indirecta en un experimento de campo a gran escala
260 ## - PUBLICACIÓN, DISTRIBUCIÓN, ETC.
Lugar de publicación, distribución, etc. México
300 ## - DESCRIPCIÓN FÍSICA
Extensión 273-291
362 0# - FECHAS DE PUBLICACIÓN Y/O DESIGNACIÓN SECUENCIAL
Fecha de publicación y/o designación secuencial 2013 Volumen 21, número 40
520 ## - NOTA DE RESUMEN, ETC.
Sumario, etc. A defining aspect of human cooperation is the use of sophisticated indirect reciprocity. We observe others, talk about others, and act accordingly. We help those who help others, and we cooperate expecting that others will cooperate in return. Indirect reciprocity is based on reputation, which spreads by communication. A crucial aspect of indirect reciprocity is observability: reputation effects can support cooperation as long as peoples’ actions can be observed by others. In evolutionary models of indirect reciprocity, natural selection favors cooperation when observability is sufficiently high. Complimenting this theoretical work are experiments where observability promotes cooperation among small groups playing games in the laboratory. Until now, however, there has been little evidence of observability’s power to promote large-scale cooperation in real world settings. Here we provide such evidence using a field study involving 2,413 subjects. We collaborated with a utility company to study participation in a program designed to prevent blackouts. We show that observability triples participation in this public goods game. The effect is over four times larger than offering a $25 monetary incentive, the company’s previous policy. Furthermore, as predicted by indirect reciproc­ity, we provide evidence that reputational concerns are driving our observability effect. In sum, we show how indirect reciprocity can be harnessed to increase cooperation in a relevant, real-world public goods game
653 0# - TERMINO DE INDIZACION - NO CONTROLADO
Término no controlado JUEGO
653 0# - TERMINO DE INDIZACION - NO CONTROLADO
Término no controlado COOPERACION
653 0# - TERMINO DE INDIZACION - NO CONTROLADO
Término no controlado RECIPROCIDAD DIRECTA
653 0# - TERMINO DE INDIZACION - NO CONTROLADO
Término no controlado RECIPROCIDAD INDIRECTA
856 4# - LOCALIZACIÓN Y ACCESO ELECTRÓNICOS
Identificador Uniforme del Recurso <a href="http://www.centrolombardo.edu.mx/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/40-14_yoeli_et_al.pdf">http://www.centrolombardo.edu.mx/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/40-14_yoeli_et_al.pdf</a>
905 ## - TIPO DE MATERIAL
Tipo de material Articulo

No items available.