Las emociones como metaprogramas : lo que la psicología evolucionista nos puede enseñar sobre éstas
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ArticlePublication details: México Description: 135-154Subject(s): EMOCIONES | PSICOLOGIA EVOLUCIONISTA | COGNICIONOnline resources: Click here to access online Abstract: Emotions as meta-programms: what evolutionary pshychology can teach us about themThe problem of how to characterize emotions is still open. Different approaches have been grouped into two major views: on the one hand, cognitive theory holds that emotions are essentially constituted by some kind of evaluative judgment; on the other, perceptual theory denies that an evaluation of that sort is necessary for an emotion to occur. In this paper I examine the proposal of evolutionary psychology, specially in the face of emotion problems. In particular, I consider the possibility that their original conception of emotions as superordinate programs, could solve the dispute between the perceptual view and those that defend that a cognitive component, usually an appraisal, is required for an emotion to occur
Emotions as meta-programms: what evolutionary pshychology can teach us about themThe problem of how to characterize emotions is still open. Different approaches have been grouped into two major views: on the one hand, cognitive theory holds that emotions are essentially constituted by some kind of evaluative judgment; on the other, perceptual theory denies that an evaluation of that sort is necessary for an emotion to occur. In this paper I examine the proposal of evolutionary psychology, specially in the face of emotion problems. In particular, I consider the possibility that their original conception of emotions as superordinate programs, could solve the dispute between the perceptual view and those that defend that a cognitive component, usually an appraisal, is required for an emotion to occur
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