000 01739nab a2200241 a 4500
005 20210219163304.0
008 991125s1985 mx 000 0 spa u
035 _aUPN01000219962
049 _aART
100 1 _aCalderón, Juan Ernesto
100 1 _ujecalderon99@yahoo.com.ar
222 0 _aLUDUS VITILIS : REVISTA DE FILOSOFIA DE LAS CIENCIAS DE LA VIDA
245 0 4 _aThe hypothetical-deductive method or the inference to the best explanation :
_bthe case of the theory of evolution by natural selection
260 _aMéxico
300 _a127-134
362 0 _a2016 Volumen 23, número 45
520 3 _aCritical rationalism sustains that the best way of evaluating scientific theories is through the hypothetical-deductive method. Scientific hypotheses are tested deducting observational conducts from them. The task of science is to refute hypotheses, which mandates to postulate other hypotheses which can surpass the previous ones in terms of their precision and explanatory content. However, according to the Duhem-Quine thesis, the problem is that a hypothesis can never be totally refuted. In view of this, the hypothetical-deductive method appears as extremely permissive, but minimally probative. The aims of this paper are to show that: (1) the so-called ‘inference to the best explanation’ gives a more adequate answer than the hypothetical-deductive method about how to evaluate scientific theories; (2) The theory of evolution by natural selection is a clear example of what is pointed out in (1)
653 0 _aMETODO HIPOTETICO-DEDUCTIVO
653 0 _aTEORIA EVOLUTIVA POR SELECCION NATURAL
653 0 _aTEORIA CIENTIFICA
856 4 _uhttps://dialnet.unirioja.es/ejemplar/437958
905 _aArticulo
999 _c192061
_d192061