| 000 | 01555nab a2200241 a 4500 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| 005 | 20210219163304.0 | ||
| 008 | 991125s1985 mx 000 0 spa u | ||
| 035 | _aUPN01000219964 | ||
| 049 | _aART | ||
| 100 | 1 | _aMelamed, Andrea F | |
| 100 | 1 | _uafmelamed@gmail.com | |
| 222 | 0 | _aLUDUS VITILIS : REVISTA DE FILOSOFIA DE LAS CIENCIAS DE LA VIDA | |
| 245 | 0 | 4 |
_aLas emociones como metaprogramas : _blo que la psicología evolucionista nos puede enseñar sobre éstas |
| 260 | _aMéxico | ||
| 300 | _a135-154 | ||
| 362 | 0 | _a2016 Volumen 23, número 45 | |
| 520 | 3 | _aEmotions as meta-programms: what evolutionary pshychology can teach us about themThe problem of how to characterize emotions is still open. Different approaches have been grouped into two major views: on the one hand, cognitive theory holds that emotions are essentially constituted by some kind of evaluative judgment; on the other, perceptual theory denies that an evaluation of that sort is necessary for an emotion to occur. In this paper I examine the proposal of evolutionary psychology, specially in the face of emotion problems. In particular, I consider the possibility that their original conception of emotions as superordinate programs, could solve the dispute between the perceptual view and those that defend that a cognitive component, usually an appraisal, is required for an emotion to occur | |
| 653 | 0 | _aEMOCIONES | |
| 653 | 0 | _aPSICOLOGIA EVOLUCIONISTA | |
| 653 | 0 | _aCOGNICION | |
| 856 | 4 | _uhttps://dialnet.unirioja.es/ejemplar/437958 | |
| 905 | _aArticulo | ||
| 999 |
_c192063 _d192063 |
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